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COERCING ADULTS?:
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND THE ACCEPTABILITY OF
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN GOVERNMENT SETTINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Religion and religious influences in public life permeate American society.
Many aspects of daily life confirm Justice Douglas's observation in 1952 that "[w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being'-walking
by a monument of the Ten Commandments on statehouse grounds,2 reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance3 in a classroom or at a school event, or simply counting
change."4  Indeed, religious influences pervade, or at least surround, many
encounters with government in public life. The familiar words of the First
Amendment have formed the battleground over which many displays, recitations,
and religious speech have been challenged in recent years.' Stating "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"6 the Framers' words, so
carefully chosen,7 are a recurring topic of litigation and form the context of a
frequently elusive balance between religious identity and the scope of permissible
public expression of religion.
One area that has shaped the Establishment Clause debate for over forty years
is public prayer.8 The Fourth Circuit has developed an expansive view of the
coercion test, one of the major analytical doctrines in this area. While the coercion
test developed in the public-school prayer context,9 the Fourth Circuit's extension
to an adult-prayer scenario highlighted a precedential gap between a body of law
focused on minor children and a lone Supreme Court case addressing adult prayer
in a legislative situation.'0 The Fourth Circuit's approach invites fresh analysis into
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
2. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005).
3. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). The text of the Pledge of Allegiance reads: "I pledge allegiance to the
Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Id.
4. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the words "In God We Trust" are imprinted on American money).
5. See generally Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (holding that the presence of a monument on the
Texas state capitol grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,4-5 (2004) (demonstrating the recent challenge to the words "under God" but
not reaching the issue of the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding that a school-sponsored prayer before a high school football
game violated the Establishment Clause).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing and
cataloguing the various forms the First Amendment Religion Clauses took on their way to ratification).
8. See Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv.
463,464.
9. See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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the permutations of the coercion test and its relationship to community identity for
adults. This Comment seeks to frame these developments in evolving Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and also to provide practical insight into the ramifications of
that extension by the Fourth Circuit.
Part II of this Comment examines the Fourth Circuit's presentation and framing
of adult-prayer issues in Mellen v. Bunting." Part III discusses the history of and
commentary about the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding
prayer in governmental settings by tracing its development from the early 1960s.
Though the Court's decisions developed mostly in the school context,12 analytical
tools from Establishment Clause cases highlighting other Establishment Clause
areas, such as displays and funding for religious organizations, 3 greatly influenced
this development. Part IV describes and analyzes the Fourth Circuit's
understanding and application of the Court's precedent in Mellen and the other
relevant Establishment Clause cases. Part V examines the relationship and
differences between the Fourth Circuit's position on coercion, public prayer, and
community and the positions of other circuits. Part VI explores reactions within the
Fourth Circuit, especially in South Carolina, regarding the implementation of such
standards. Finally, Part VII concludes that the Fourth Circuit has identified an
important gap in Supreme Court precedent and that the ramifications of such an
analysis are significant in how community identity and religious expression
intersect in the public context.
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT IDENTIFIES A PRECEDENTIAL VOID: MELLEN V. BUNTING
Like many aspects of life at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), mealtime
rituals are formal and regimented. 4 Six nights a week from 1995 until 2002, a
bugle call summoned the Corps at this "state-operated military college" to the mess
hall for supper.15 The Corps marched "in review past the TAC Officer (the VMI
faculty member in charge) to the mess hall.' 6 Though duties varied slightly
11. 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
12. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 42; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962).
13. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
606-07 (1971).
14. "'VMI cadets live in spartan barracks where surveillance is constant and privacy nonexistent;
they wear uniforms, eat together in the mess hall, and regularly participate in drills."' Mellen, 327 F.3d
at 361 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 522 (1996)). For an in-depth view of relevant
practices at VMI and of the specific supper prayer at issue here, see Alexander A. Minard, Note, But
Could They Pray at UVA? The Fourth Circuit's Application of the Supreme Court's School Prayer
Jurisprudence to the Virginia Military Institute's Adult Cadets, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 971,
981-86 (2005).
15. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 360,362 n.5, 362-63. Although this particular set of events only occurred
for seven years, the mealtime prayer's history is much longer. VMI discontinued the prayer from 1990
until 1995 due to a change in dining format-from family style to cafeteria style. Id. at 362 n.5. When
General Bunting assumed his duties at VMI, the dinning format reverted back to family style, including
a prayer. Id.
16. Id. at 362.
[Vol. 57: 923
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss4/11
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWI
depending on class year, once in the mess hall, the Corps were commanded to
"REST," and the chaplain read his composed supper prayer for the evening. 7
While at rest, "[t]he Corps must remain standing and silent while the supper prayer
is read, but cadets are not obliged to recite the prayer, close their eyes, or bow their
heads."18
In response to a claim filed by two VMI cadets against General Josiah Bunting,
III, VMI's superintendent, the Fourth Circuit held VMI's supper prayer was a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 19 In reaching that decision, the Mellen court
recognized the Supreme Court had "never directly addressed whether the
Establishment Clause forbids state-sponsored prayer at a public college or
university."2 More broadly, the Fourth Circuit noted the Supreme Court had never
tackled the issue of prayer in governmental settings for adults except in the
historically limited context of legislative prayer.2' Thus, the Fourth Circuit
identified a significant gap in Supreme Court precedent with regard to this type of
religious expression. An extensive line of public school prayer cases existed with
regard to school children and public prayer,22 but the Supreme Court has only
addressed adult prayer in one specific scenario. 23 Notwithstanding the lack of adult
prayer precedent, the Fourth Circuit recognized that other modes of analysis used
in Establishment Clause cases applied in Mellen.24 However, the court concluded
the coercion test, an integral component in any public school prayer analysis, was
the appropriate test to follow given the context of VMI's supper prayer.,
2s
Mellen was the first decision to apply the coercion test to an adult religious
setting.26 In addressing that concern, the court noted that "[a]lthough VMI's cadets
are not children, in VMI's educational system they are uniquely susceptible to
17. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 362 (4th Cir. 2003). The court adopted the district court's
observation that "a prayer may thank God for the Institute, ask for God's blessing on the Corps, or give
thanks for the love and support of family and friends," and that "each day's prayer ends with the
following invocation: 'Now 0 God, we receive this food and share this meal together with thanksgiving.
Amen." Id. (quoting Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623 (W.D. Va. 2002)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 360. VMI itself was not a party to the action. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1020
(2004) (denying certiorari).
20. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 366.
21. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-88 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer based on its
unique historical basis and not by virtue of withstanding scrutiny under any relevant Establishment
Clause analytical test).
22. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 366-68; see infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
23. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
24. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370-71 (2003). These additional tests, most prominently
the Lemon test and the endorsement test, arose in funding and religious display cases instead of public
prayer cases. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
25. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 ("In the context of school prayer, though, we must give special
consideration, under the principles discussed in Lee and Santa Fe, to whether a state has coerced
religious worship .... [W]e therefore assess the supper prayer against the principles announced in Lee
and Santa Fe .... ).
26. Minard, supra note 14, at 973; see G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental
Institutions:The Who, the What, and the At Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 299, 339 (2001).
2006]
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coercion. ' '27 Thus, "[b]ecause of VMI's coercive atmosphere, the Establishment
Clause precludes school officials from sponsoring an official prayer, even for
mature adults., 28 Therefore, the coercion test, as understood and applied by the
Fourth Circuit, is an environmental test-impacting adults in certain circumstances.
Though the Mellen court carefully explained the determinative coercive factors at
VMI, especially that "submission and conformity remain[] central tenets of VMI's
educational philosophy,, 29 the court's recognition that coercion can exist beyond
the confines of public elementary or secondary school raises a host of issues related
to the possible extensions of the coercion test. Specifically, the coercion test, as
applied in Mellen, implicates notions of religious expression as related to
community inclusion and expressions of identity. Therefore, exploring the
Constitutional setting from which Mellen arose and the Establishment Clause
precedents it construed is necessary to understand the Fourth Circuit's decision.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY AND A PLETHORA OF TESTS
Public prayer in a variety of contexts has remained an important and divisive
Establishment Clause issue for over forty years.3" Though the Supreme Court has
developed at least four distinct analytical tests for Establishment Clause
violations,3' the nuances and exact applications of the tests remain unclear. Justices
and commentators have characterized this area of Constitutional law as "bedeviled
(so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions,"3 2 "a constitutional muddle with
a series of unsatisfactory and unclear standards and outcomes,"33 and, a "many-
headed Hydra of Greek mythology., 34 Indeed, Mellen noted the "federal appellate
courts have also followed an inconsistent approach" in applying Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.35 Prayer in a governmental context occurs in many
situations. In the past three decades, the Supreme Court has tackled scenarios as
diverse as prayer in the Nebraska Legislature,36 prayer during public school
graduations, 37 and prayer before high school football games. 38  The standards
stemming from these decisions and others in the Establishment Clause arena,
however, have left a body ofjurisprudence as diverse as the cases from which these
27. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
28. Id. at 371-72.
29. Id. at 361.
30. See Gey, supra note 8, at 464.
31. Collectively, these tests are known as the Lemon test, the endorsement test, the Marsh test,
and the coercion test. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
32. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Gey, supra note 8, at 464.
34. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 299.
35. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003).
36. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
37. Lee, 505 U.S. at 580.
38. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
[Vol. 57: 923
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standards arose.39
Public prayer decisions mainly focused on the public school context. Two
Supreme Court cases in the early 1960s formed the foundation of its school-prayer
jurisprudence. In Engel, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute
requiring daily recitation of a prayer in public school.4" The next Term, in School
District ofAbington v. Schempp, 41 the Supreme Court held that Bible readings in
public school classrooms were unconstitutional. 2 Thus, the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence regarding government-sponsored prayer prevented overt
prayer or religious exercises in public schools. In discussing how and why the
practices at issue in Engel and Schempp violated the Establishment Clause, the
Court differentiated between the Establishment and Free Exercise43 Clauses of the
First Amendment. "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause,
does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not., 44 Under Engel's
definition of the Establishment Clause, the Establishment Clause prohibited more
than merely coercive behavior.45 Therefore, a coercion test, no matter how defined
or potentially applied, was not an essential part of early Establishment Clause
jurisprudence regarding school prayer.46 References in Schempp to "the purpose
and the primary effect" further formed the groundwork for later tests.47
Establishment Clause cases in non-prayer scenarios also greatly influenced
general doctrinal development. Supreme Court jurisprudence gained its most
widely applicable test in the early 1970s-the three part inquiry set forth in
39. See Gey, supra note 8, at 466-72.
40. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430,436 (1962). The challenged law in Engel did not require
school children to recite a prayer-the children could be silent or be excused. Id. at 430.
41. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
42. Id. at 205. In Schempp, the school practice in question included a daily broadcast of Bible
verses over the intercom followed by all students' recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Id. at 207. A child
could be excused from participation, but the plaintiff in this case kept his children in the classroom
because he wanted his children to be accepted by fellow students and teachers. Id. at 208 n.3.
43. The text of the Free Exercise Clause follows the Establishment Clause and states, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, orprohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
44. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 ("[A] violation of the Free Exercise
Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.").
45. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause go much further than that.").
46. Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the
Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 158-60 (1994); Timothy L.
Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 66 (1993).
47. Schempp, 372 U.S. at 222; see infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
2006]
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Lemon.48 Lemon involved a question of the constitutionality of state statutes that
granted financial assistance to non-public school teachers, especially teachers in
parochial schools.49 The Court enunciated its three-part test based on material
gleaned from earlier cases when it held the statutes were unconstitutional0 . "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'' The
Lemon test has been applied in numerous Establishment Clause scenarios and has
become the standard by which nearly every potential Establishment Clause
violation has been measured.52 As Justice Blackmun noted in 1992, "[s]ince 1971,
the Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one instance, the
decision of Marsh v. Chambers, has the Court not rested its decision on the basic
principles described in Lemon. '
However, in the decades since Lemon, nuances and further related tests have
added intricacies and uncertainties to this doctrine. One of the earliest suggested
alternatives to Lemon was the "endorsement test," first proposed by Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence to the Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly.54 In
Lynch, the Supreme Court applied Lemon and held that a town's display of a creche
in an outside Christmas holiday display did not violate the Establishment Clause.55
Advocating a "clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine," Justice
O'Connor proposed a test centered on whether the government makes "religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.9
56
This test for government endorsement of religion sought to combine the purpose
and effect prongs of the Lemon test.5 However, in practice, courts applying the
endorsement test have done so in addition to applying the Lemon test in full.5"
As in other Establishment Clause cases, Lemon considerations have shaped
48. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). A great deal of scholarship focuses on
Lemon and its three-prong test. See generally Gey, supra note 8, at 467-72 (examining the variety of
responses to Lemon from both scholarly and judicial sources); Minard, supra note 14, at 1001-03
(discussing multiple avenues of Establishment Clause reform).
49. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
50. Id. at 607.
51. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
52. See Gey, supra note 8, at 467-68.
53. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,603 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Marsh is discussed later in this Comment. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
54. 465 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 687 (majority opinion). In addition to the creche, the "Seasons Greetings" display
included secular reminders of the Christmas season, including Santa Claus, reindeer, and a Christmas
tree. Id. at 671. Such inclusiveness, in part, led the Court to conclude: "We are satisfied that the city
has a secular purpose for including the creche, that the city has not impermissibly advanced religion,
and that including the creche does not create excessive entanglement between religion and
government." Id. at 685.
56. Id. at 687, 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 690.
58. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 333-34.
[Vol. 57: 923
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school prayer decisions.5 9 In addition to applying Lemon, however, recent Supreme
Court opinions on public school prayer highlight the scendancy of the "coercion
test. '6' Although political coercion formed an early framework for Establishment
Clause analysis, 6' by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the scope and tone of the
coercion analysis focused on the psychological impacts of the governmental
religious action. 62 First proposed by Justice Kennedy in an earlier concurrence,
63
the Court adopted a coercion analysis as part of its Establishment Clause doctrine
in Lee.64 Lee involved a middle school graduation ceremony in which the school
invited a rabbi to give an invocation and benediction.6 5 Though students were
neither required to overtly join the prayer nor to signal their participation in any
way, the Court held the public school district's "supervision and control... places
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students" and "[t]his
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.
66
Though the Court did not delineate a clear test for coercion, it stated, "[T]he
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use
more direct means., 67 Thus, where there is social pressure to conform, coercion
may also be present.
In the most recent Supreme Court holding in this area, Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, the Court cemented the coercion analysis by applying it to
declare prayers before high school football games unconstitutional.68 Santa Fe held
that a school-sponsored but student-composed and presented method for pre-game
prayer failed the coercion test. 69 In so holding, the Court implicitly recognized
further permutations of coercion independent of the classroom or graduation stage.
Although attendance at football games is neither mandatory for most students70 nor
"one of life's most significant occasions," 71 the Santa Fe court classified it-and
59. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (holding an Alabama statute
mandating a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer was unconstitutional, largely because
it failed Lemon's secular purpose prong; the Court could not discern any secular purpose because the
statute under attack only added the voluntary prayer option to an existing "moment of silence" statute.).
60. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. Both Santa Fe and Lee, the lynchpins of the
coercion framework, discuss and incorporate Lemon standards in their holdings. See Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-15 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992).
61. See Graham, supra note 46, at 154-58 (noting coercion was a prevalent mode of analysis in
Establishment Clause decisions prior to 1962).
62. Paula Savage Cohen, Comment, Psycho-Coercion, A New Establishment Clause Test: Lee
v. Weisman and Its Initial Effect, 73 B.U. L. REv. 501, 512-13 (1993).
63. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 662 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 593.
67. Id. at 594.
68. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000).
69. Id. at311.
70. Id. (noting that attendance at football games is mandatory for some students, such as for
football players, cheerleaders, and band members).
71. Lee, 530 U.S. at 595.
2006]
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other extracurricular activities-"as part of a complete educational experience.,
72
Therefore, the Court recognized that coercion can seep into any school related
activity-expanding the coercion test's reach beyond Lee's graduation scenario.
The coercion test took on a somewhat environmental framework under Santa Fe,
as the entire football game atmosphere contributed to the prayer's coercive effects.73
Endorsement also played a role in Justice Stevens' analysis in Santa Fe, as he
linked the coercive environment at the football game with inclusion and
participation in the local community.74 As in Lee, however, the Court focused on
coercive effects on students, not other attendees.75 The Lee Court explained the
ramifications of the coercion test in public schools: "The concern [of indirect
coercion] may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced
there."76 Further, the Court clarified that it was not addressing coercion "if the
affected citizens are mature adults,' 7  thereby confining the coercion test to a public
school context. Though Santa Fe explored and expanded the coercion test's
applicability within the public school environment, such an analysis has remained
confined to elementary and secondary schools in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
To add a further complication to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Marsh
firmly broke away from all previous Establishment Clause tests and applied a
completely different standard. In Marsh, the only state-sponsored prayer case
outside the public school arena, the Court upheld the Nebraska Legislature's daily
practice of opening each session with a nonsectarian prayer by its chaplain, a
Presbyterian minister.78 Instead of applying the Lemon test or any other test to this
legislative prayer, the Court chose to decide constitutionality based on the
established and continual history of legislative prayer in such bodies.7 9 Legislative
prayer in this context was "a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country."8 Although even the dissent in Marsh noted the
majority was "carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather than
reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer,"'"
Marsh remains the only Supreme Court decision regarding government-sponsored
prayer in an adult context.82 Indeed, the Marsh Court explicitly recognized that
"the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily
72. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311.
73. Id. at 311-12; see also Sara R. Grossman, Comment, The Football Game Prayer Decision:
How the Supreme Court Dropped the Ball in Santa Fe, 38 Hous. L. REv. 615, 645 (2001) (noting that
through Santa Fe's expansion of the coercion test, "[a]rguably, all school-related events requiring
student attendance, especially graduation, become coercive under Lee v. Weisman").
74. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
75. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
592-93 (1992).
76. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
77. Id. at 593.
78. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-86 (1983).
79. Id. at 790-91.
80. Id. at 792.
81. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339.
[Vol. 57: 923
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susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or peer pressure. ' 3
Finally, the Supreme Court had occasion to revisit its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence when General Bunting of VMI appealed the Fourth Circuit's
decision. 4 In denying certiorari, the Court offered a rare opinion, 5 which stated
why the issue was not appropriate for current review. 6 Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, focused on jurisdiction and standing issues as the main reasons for
denying certiorari instead of the constitutional ramifications.87 Because General
Bunting had since retired from VMI and the cadets challenging the supper prayer
had graduated, no "live controversy" existed. 8 Justice Scalia viewed the technical
aspects of the claim differently and sharply dissented from the Court's denial of
certiorari; he stated that the Court should follow a "constitutional-question-first
procedure" when evaluating "damages suits brought against government officers."8 9
After advocating that the Court hear the case, Justice Scalia argued that "[t]he
weighty questions raised by petitioners-about the proper application of Lee where
adults rather than children are the subjects . . . deserve this Court's attention,
particularly since the decisions of two other Circuits are in apparent contradiction
as to whether Lee can extend so far."9 Other circuits examining public university
prayer had not found such state-sponsored prayer unconstitutional and had not
applied the coercion test.91 Justice Stevens did not find the circuit split argument
persuasive, as he dismissed this issue's urgency by citing "the unique features of
VMI." 92 He did, however, acknowledge "the importance of [the] case. 93 Perhaps
Mellen was not the proper procedural case to present these constitutional issues to
the Court, but the application of Lee to adult scenarios is a germane issue. National
resolution of this issue must wait, but in the Fourth Circuit, the coercion test
remains a potentially applicable Establishment Clause test in adult settings.
Now, thirty years after the Court instituted the Lemon test, there are four viable
frameworks through which to view government-sponsored prayer in adult settings.94
83. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (citations omitted); but see Deanna N. Pihos, Note, Assuming Maturity
Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1349, 1353 (2005) (arguing that courts have consistently maintained, without questioning this
assumption, throughout Establishment Clause jurisprudence that the maturity level of the audience
makes a difference in constitutional analysis).
84. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
85. See Minard, supra note 14, at 996.
86. Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1019.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1020.
89. Id. at 1022 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. Importantly, both of these cases were decided
before the Court's Santa Fe decision in 2000. See id.
92. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1021-22 (2004). Justice Scalia noted VMI's unique
characteristics, but he found that this "basis for distinguishing.., is, to put it mildly, a frail one." Id.
at 1026 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1021.
94. The four frameworks are the Lemon test, the Marsh test, the endorsement test, and the
coercion test. See supra notes 48, 54, 60, 79 and accompanying text.
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As with any Establishment Clause question, the body of jurisprudence a court or
attorney must analyze is convoluted and unpredictable.95 Thus, many lower courts
analyze cases through multiple frameworks because of this variable body of law. 96
As the Mellen court observed, despite extensive precedent in other contexts,
nothing adequately resolved issues regarding permissible prayer for adults in non-
legislative sessions.97
Concern about a coercive standard for public prayer in adult settings fits within
two general bodies of scholarly commentary. The first focuses on the coercion
test's general framework as a viable analytical method. The second focuses on the
Marsh decision and its role in interpreting further situations. With the rise of the
coercion test's application during the 1990s and 2000s, commentators have sought
to determine this test's place within the scope and hierarchy of jurisprudence.
Fueled greatly by frustration with Lemon, scholarly and judicial attention often
focus on finding the proper balance between the various tests and their relevant
considerations.98 Though some scholarship embraces some form of the coercion
test,99 commentators, to a large degree, have not viewed the coercion analysis with
particular favor. One of the most general and consistent themes of the criticism is
that an analysis based purely or even primarily on coercion fails to thoroughly
consider all Establishment Clause implications. 00 Even Supreme Court Justices
have concurred with a coercion analysis but not viewed it as a perfectly congruent
95. See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 299; Gey, supra note 8, at 467; Minard, supra note 14, at 972.
96. See generally Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002), rev 'd on standing
grounds, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (stating that "for purposes of completeness, we will analyze the school
district policy and the 1954 Act under all three tests"-Lemon, endorsement, and coercion).
97. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2003).
98. See generally NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 205 (2005) (arguing that the endorsement
test reformed Establishment Clause analysis into an inquiry into individual equality and away from
Lemon's focus on secularism); Gey, supra note 8, at 464 (noting that multiple groups of advocates argue
"that the Court should clean up its Establishment Clause jurisprudence by clarifying the principles the
clause is intended to serve"); Hall, supra note 46, at 40 (observing that the hegemony of the Lemon test
is waning and that debates over a "successor doctrine" include a variety of perspectives).
99. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom
at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 158-59 (1992) (noting that recognizing coercion as an aspect
of the Establishment Clause analysis "would restore the symmetry between the Religion Clauses that
was broken when the Court [in Engel and Schempp] declared that coercion was an element of the
violation of the Free Exercise Clause but not of the Establishment Clause"). However, McConnell
further argued that coercion, by itself, is not sufficient to differentiate between establishment and
nonestablishment. Id. at 158; see also FELDMAN, supra note 98, at 237 (arguing that the best
articulation of the Establishment Clause is that "the state may neither coerce anyone in matters of
religion, nor expend its resources so as to support religious institutions and practices").
100. See Gey, supra note 8, at 465 (arguing that if coercion formed the exclusive Establishment
Clause guide, religion and its expression would become "a legitimate matter of collective governmental
concern"); Hall, supra note 46, at 65-66 (arguing that adherence to the coercion test by itself would
allow religious practices "with distinguished historical pedigrees and broad public support" and
undermine the basic reasons for having an Establishment Clause at all); Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The
Supreme Court's Coercion Test: Insufficient Constitutional Protection for America's Religious
Minorities, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 245,246 (2001) (arguing that the coercion test only focuses
on the narrow realm of "coercion within institutional settings and the ability of dissenters to respond"
instead of adequately protecting against all permutations of Establishment Clause violations).
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test.' Scholars within the legal community also have generally not coined the
coercion test as Lemon's successor as the dominant Establishment Clause
analysis.0 2 Nevertheless, the sentiment remains that the Court should not "be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area,"'13 and that the
coercion test remains a possible mode of analysis for lower courts to apply.'
4
A further body of applicable scholarship has analyzed the Marsh framework
on legislative prayer and analyzed its place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Marsh is the Supreme Court's only Establishment Clause case to rest on historical
reasoning, and therefore, many observers view this rationale as severely limited and
flawed.'0 5 Another view of Marsh focuses on the fact that in its decision, the
Supreme Court only addressed public prayer for adults. 6  The coercion
formulations of public prayer standards arose in a public elementary and secondary
school context in Lee and Santa Fe.'°7 One commentator viewed this dichotomy
as a "bright line" between analyses applicable to adults and those applicable to
children when it comes to possible Establishment Clause violations.'18 As Part IV
discusses, current Fourth Circuit holdings have blurred this bright line and injected
the coercion test into areas usually thought to be reserved for a Marsh-style of
analysis. The Fourth Circuit's position further questions the validity of Marsh in
adult-prayer scenarios that stray away from historically based legislative prayer.'0 9
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: THE COERCION TEST
With so many potential nuanced standards to apply, federal district and
appellate courts have an extensive body of precedent to work through to resolve
101. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (viewing
government coercion as unnecessary, but "sufficient," to prove an Establishment Clause violation); id.
at 619 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating "a showing of coercion is [not] necessary to a successful
Establishment Clause claim").
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; Gey, supra note 8, at 465-66; McConnell, supra
note 99, at 158.
103. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
104. The Fourth Circuit explained the relationship between the Lemon and coercion tests in the
following manner: "While Lemon dominates Establishment Clause jurisprudence, coercion has emerged
as a prevailing consideration in the school prayer context." Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th
Cir. 2003).
105. See Hall, supra note 46, at 47 (stating "Marsh is the triumph of history over principle. It
rendered the Establishment Clause unintelligible by substituting historical citation for principled
adjudication"); Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 359, 362
(1988) (stating that "[u]nless we can articulate some principle that explains why legislative chaplains
might not violate the [E]stablishment [C]lause,.... we cannot uphold a practice that so clearly violates
fundamental principles").
106. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339.
107. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
108. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339; see also Pihos, supra note 83, at 1365 (noting that "the
level of education at which the prayer occurs is a crucial factor in determining the scrutiny to which the
Court will subject the prayer").
109. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370; infra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
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Establishment Clause challenges. The Fourth Circuit has decided a wide variety
of Establishment Clause cases in the past five to seven years by applying the most
recent formulations of Supreme Court standards and tests."'° One of the most
interesting facets of this doctrinal development in the Fourth Circuit is the
application of the coercion test. Through Mellen, the Fourth Circuit expanded the
reach of the coercion test beyond the primary and secondary school context of Lee
and into the realm of adult religious situations.' This context invites inquiry into
the exact formulations of the Fourth Circuit's standards for coercion and invites
analysis of those situations in public life in which government-sponsored religious
observation may be deemed unconstitutional as a product of the Fourth Circuit's
expansive formulation of coercion.
Although in recent years the Fourth Circuit has decided a wide range of
education-based issues under the coercion test," 12 its test for coercion evolved most
explicitly in Child Evangelism and Mellen."3 Child Evangelism arose from a
challenge to the Montgomery County School District's policy of not allowing the
Child Evangelism Fellowship group to distribute fliers that advertised the religious
group to school students." 4 The Fourth Circuit, per Judge Motz, relied on the
coercion test and held the exclusion of the Child Evangelism Fellowship group
from the district's limited public forum did not violate the Establishment Clause." 5
Noting "the Supreme Court has never found unconstitutional coercion in an equal
access case,"' 16 Judge Motz formulated a general two-part inquiry for coercion: (1)
"the context in which the assertedly coerced activity occurs" and (2) "the character
110. See generally Myers v. Loudon County Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance on an Establishment Clause challenge);
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292,301-02 (4th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Marsh to conclude
that a town council's invocation violated the Establishment Clause); Child Evangelism Fellowship of
Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 597 (4th Cir. 2004) (analyzing a challenge
to the distribution of religious fliers in a school under the coercion test); Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370- 71
(4th Cir. 2003) (using Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests to hold VMI's supper prayer
unconstitutional).
111. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371-72; see also Minard, supra note 14, at 991-93 (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's approach in Mellen with respect to college-age students).
112. See Myers, 418 F.3d at 397, 406-08 (holding that the Pledge of Allegiance cannot be
coercive because it is a patriotic, and not a religious exercise); Child Evangelism, 373 F.3d at 591-96
(allowing distribution of a religious flier in public schools because the act of distributing a religious flier
along with other community announcements was not coercive); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265,
281-82 (4th Cir. 200 1) (holding that a Virginia statute mandating a moment of silence was not coercive,
thus no Establishment Clause violation occurred); Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274,
287-88 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding no unconstitutional coercion in allowing Bibles to be available for pick
up at a display booth at a high school).
113. See Child Evangelism, 373 F.3d at 598; Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371-72.
114. Child Evangelism, 373 F.3d at 591.
115. Id. at 598, 608. Child Evangelism Fellowship is a Christian organization that "establishes
Good News Clubs that meet in elementary schools throughout the country." Id. at 592. The
organization sought to distribute promotional fliers at school, and the school district's refusal formed
the basis of the constitutional challenge. Id. at 592.
116. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589,
598 (4th Cir. 2004).
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of the activity itself."'" 7 Broadly, Child Evangelism 1 8 involved equal access to a
public forum; presumably, the limited context of public prayer might provoke a
different result."9 The character prong of Judge Motz's inquiry focused on the
narrow issue of whether the government's activity requires students to "'support or
participate in religion or its exercise.""' 2
Mellen took a similar view of the coercive environment but expanded the scope
of such an environment to potentially include religious situations involving
adults.' 2 ' Writing for the Mellen court, Judge King held that coercion does not
necessarily hinge on age; rather, it is a product of the surrounding context or
environment.'22 Therefore, a coercive atmosphere can preclude the government
"from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature adults."'
123
In Mellen, the Fourth Circuit identified further permutations and nuances of the
coercion test. Following in Santa Fe's footsteps with such recognition,' 24 the
Mellen court concluded that coercion is an environmental inquiry requiring an
examination of all relevant circumstances-in Mellen those "circumstances"
included "VMI's adversative method of education."125 Mellen also intertwined other
Establishment Clause tests and their respective concerns with the coercion analysis.
Like Santa Fe, Mellen jointly examined coercion and endorsement to conclude that
"'an objective observer, acquainted with the [supper prayer] would perceive it as
a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."",126 Thus, linking acceptance in
the community, however defined, with religious participation was an important
aspect of the Mellen court's coercion inquiry. Finally, the Mellen court rejected a
Marsh-based analysis to determine the supper prayer's constitutionality; the Fourth
Circuit's opinion focused on Marsh's historical reasoning and not on its adult
religious context. 12 7 Because VMI could not establish the type of historical base
present in legislative prayer, Marsh simply did not apply.'28 Therefore, Mellen
refrained Supreme Court jurisprudence to address the area of government-
sponsored prayer in a new scenario.1
29
Not all the judges on the Fourth Circuit embraced Mellen, however. Almost
four months after the decision in Mellen, the Fourth Circuit denied General
117. Id.
118. Id. at 599.
119. Id. at 598 n.5 ("[T]he prayer cases.., do not provide an appropriate analogue. Those cases
did not involve equal access; rather, government officials granted an inherently religious activity
(prayer) sole access to student audiences.").
120. Id. at 599 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
121. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
122. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Although VMI's cadets are not
children, in VMI's educational system they are uniquely susceptible to coercion.").
123. Id. at 371-72.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
125. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
126. Id. at 374 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)); see also
supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 370.
128. Id.
129. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372-73 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Bunting's petition for rehearing en banc. 13' The decision not to reconsider the case
was very close,13' and several judges wrote dissenting opinions expressing concern
about the possible ramifications of allowing Mellen to stand. Judge Wilkinson
criticized the Mellen court for ignoring "how essential an ingredient the age and
maturity of audiences have been in the Supreme Court's decisions" regarding
coercion.' 32 Noting that important distinctions exist between the voluntary presence
of college age students in any higher education setting and the compelled presence
of younger children and adolescents at school, Judge Wilkinson cautioned against
unintended consequences stemming from Mellen.133 Extending the coercion test
into adult religious situations calls into question all forms of solemnizing prayer in
any situation, including Marsh-like legislative prayer scenarios. 134 Similarly, Judge
Niemeyer's dissent focused on the extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence in a
way that may move "in the alarming direction of purging all public places of
religion."'
135
Concerns reflected in the Mellen denial of rehearing en banc dissents tap into
similar sentiments in judicial opinions and academia. As Judge Wilkinson wrote,
"There is a danger that in overturning long and widely accepted accommodations,
courts will divide a community rather than unite it. A primary aim of the
Establishment Clause is to prevent divisiveness over matters of religion.' ' 136 Judge
Wilkinson's view warned that judicial force in this area could provoke a dangerous
backlash from those seeking to retain some level of religious or ceremonial content
in public life. 13 Concerns about divisiveness over religion played a significant role
in early Establishment Clause history and analysis, 13 and this analytical framework
is reasserting itself-though with a different focus. Justice Breyer's concurrence
in Van Orden, which held the display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas
130. See Mellen v. Bunting, 341 F.3d 312, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
131. Id. ("Judges Widener, Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Luttig, Williams, and Shedd voted in favor [of
a rehearing]. Chief Judge Wilkins, along with Judges Michael, Motz, Traxler, King, and Gregory voted
against rehearing en banc. A majority of the active judges having failed to vote in favor of rehearing
en banc, rehearing en banc is also hereby denied.").
132. Id. at 319-20 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 320-23. Generally, Judge Wilkinson saw value in the supper prayer because "it
familiarizes cadets with religious practices, it encourages religious tolerance, and it aids students in
reflecting upon their own beliefs." Id. at 322. Specifically, in a military sense, Judge Wilkinson noted
that "to ban communal exercises is to ban a form of fellowship that may sustain soldiers in their darkest
and most dangerous hours." Id. at 323. Communal prayer in this setting, then, served many positive,
community-building functions.
134. Mellen, 341 F.3d 312, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 329 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 324 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson also noted, "By deeming VMI's
adversative training as coercive, the panel has made the discipline inherent in all military environments
a sufficient basis for invalidating any nonsectarian prayer." Id.
137. Id. at 324.
138. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 98, at 19-56 (tracing the history and development of the
Establishment Clause in American life). These earlier concerns, however, focused more on the
divisiveness that religion would cause as opposed to the divisiveness that could occur if religion was
removed from the public sphere. Id.
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statehouse grounds was constitutional, emphasizes divisiveness concerns. 39
Classifying the attempt to remove the monument as "hostility toward religion,"
Breyer asserted that such attempts "could thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid."' 40 A broader
view of these trends involves an examination of the relationship between those who
want public prayer in some measure and those who do not. 4' In attempting "to
make public discourse inclusive," those who desire to stamp out public prayer
"unintentionally generat[ed] resentment that has motivated a strand of militant"
people who desire public religious expression.'42 Thus, the Mellen dichotomy
within the Fourth Circuit-recognizing the expansive permutations of the Supreme
Court's coercion test while identifying its potential divisiveness-shows the
inherent conflict in current forms of these issues at all levels of analysis.
Although the Fourth Circuit has not purged "all public places of religion"'
4 3
through Mellen, two later Fourth Circuit decisions have somewhat clarified the
realm of the coercion test's reach within the circuit. Both cases revolved around
challenges to public prayer at town council meetings and rested on a Marsh-type
analysis under the category of legislative prayer.'" In both Wynne and Simpson,
the plaintiffs were followers of Wicca, a belief system stemming from ancient
Paganism, and both of the plaintiffs sought participation in local government
meetings. 145 However, those are the only factual similarities between Wynne and
Simpson. In Wynne, the town council of Great Falls, South Carolina, opened each
meeting with a prayer specifically invoking the name and guidance of Jesus
Christ.'46 In Simpson, by contrast, the Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors
sent invitations to all religious congregations in the county phone directory and
allowed each congregation's leader to deliver a non-sectarian prayer at a meeting
on a first come, first serve basis.147 Legislative prayer, as a general concept, is
constitutional as recognized Marsh. But the Wynne court used the underpinnings
of the prayer in Marsh to hold the Great Falls prayer unconstitutional. The
sectarian nature of the prayer invoking Jesus Christ is "simply not constitutionally
acceptable legislative prayer like that approved in Marsh."'4 8 In Simpson, however,
139. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. See FELDMAN, supra note 98, at 6 (arguing that "[t]he deep divide in American life, then,
is not primarily over religious belief or affiliation-it is over the role that belief should play in the
business of politics and government").
142. Id. at 243.
143. Mellen, 341 F.3d 312, 329 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The Fourth
Circuit has upheld subsequent challenges to public prayer.
144. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F. 3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stating "Marsh v. Chambers controls the outcome of this case"); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376
F.3d 292, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating "Marsh does not permit legislators to do what the district
court... found the Town Council of Great Falls did here").
145. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279-80; Wynne, 376 F.3d at 294-95.
146. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 295; see also Tim Smith & Angelia Davis, State Joins Town 's Appeal
on Prayer, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Mar. 5, 2005, at 15A.
147. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.
148. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301-02.
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the court construed Marsh to hold that "a practice [will] remain constitutionally
unremarkable where 'there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.
,
"
14 9
Wynne and Simpson both relied exclusively on Marsh to reach their respective
holdings, thereby demonstrating that the Fourth Circuit has not found the coercion
test applicable to all adult settings. Indeed, only Simpson cites the Mellen decision
and makes any reference to coercion at all.' ° Writing for the court in Simpson,
Judge Wilkinson, whose dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Mellen
catalogued Mellen's many potential pitfalls,' 5' distinguished a clear legislative
prayer scenario from any other situation involving government-sponsored prayer. '52
Although Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Simpson remains consistent with his
position in the Mellen denial of rehearing en banc, a more telling example of the
Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to invoke the coercion test in a legislative prayer
scenario is the fact that Judge King, who wrote the opinion in Mellen employing the
coercion test, joined the opinion in Wynne, which made no mention of coercion in
the context of legislative prayer."' Thus, in the field of true legislative prayer, the
Fourth Circuit is apparently unwilling to use the coercion test.
Where, then, does this wide variety of Fourth Circuit precedent leave the
coercion test? As a test applied by the Supreme Court in only a public elementary
and secondary school setting,'54 the coercion test has had its most universal
application in a wide variety of public school cases. Whether there is a public
prayer issue or an equal access issue, the coercion test is an applicable and viable
test in public school situations."' Similarly, the coercion test is not applicable to
legislative prayer among adults-various members of the Fourth Circuit have
refused to supplant or even supplement the Marsh analysis with an analysis based
on coercion.'5 6 The middle ground, therefore, between prayer involving children
and legislative prayer for adults is the area in which the Fourth Circuit's coercion
analysis is most distinct. As expressed in Child Evangelism and Mellen, the Fourth
149. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983)).
150. Id. at 282-83.
151. Mellen, 341 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying notes 132-37.
152. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 282 (stating that "[t]o ignore Marsh, when the Supreme Court explicitly
tied Marsh to the domain of legislative prayer, would be to ignore the Supreme Court's own
directions").
153. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301-02 (focusing exclusively on a Marsh-based analysis). Further,
Judge Motz, who wrote the opinion in Wynne, also voted to deny rehearing en banc in Mellen. Id. at
294; Mellen, 341 F.3d at 313.
154. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
155. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
156. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2005);
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2004). In the Simpson and Wynne
opinions, Judges King, Motz, Niemeyer, Wilkinson, and Williams never attempted a coercion-based
analysis. Notably, Judge King wrote the panel opinion in Mellen. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355,
360 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Circuit's coercion test focuses more on context and environment than on the age
and maturity levels of the participants in government-sponsored prayer.'57
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit has recognized and expanded on the nuances of
the coercion test, much as Justice Stevens did in the Santa Fe opinion. 5 8 Further,
the Fourth Circuit recognized coercion may be present when the government makes
prayer a part of the community identity, such as when VMI made prayer central to
its educational environment.' 59 On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Lee wrote
that the "risk of indirect coercion... may not be limited to the context of schools,
but it is most pronounced there."' 16 The Court also noted in Lee that its decision did
"not address... [where] the affected citizens are mature adults."'16' Scholars have
confined their commentary on the Fourth Circuit's recent jurisprudence primarily
to the college and university setting. 62  Scholarship has, however, focused on
coercion and the level of government at which it takes place. 163  Though
environmental factors are important, the age and maturity of those affected remains
the dispositive issue.' 64 The discussion and the conclusions reached concerning the
bright line between frameworks applied to adults and school children, however,
occurred before the Fourth Circuit decided Mellen, which cast a great shadow on
this previously perceived bright line. Thus, Mellen underscores criticism of Marsh
as historical analysis instead of an analysis focused on mature adults. 65  The
question currently facing the Fourth Circuit is to what extent and in what contexts
public prayer for adults, which does not fall under the Marsh analysis, is susceptible
to an expanded coercion analysis based on Mellen.
V. OTHER CIRCUITS AND PUBLIC PRAYER FOR ADULTS
Although the Fourth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to apply the
coercion test to a group of adults, other circuit courts have considered adult prayer
issues and declined to apply a coercion-based analysis when adult prayer is in
157. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d
589, 598 (4th Cir. 2004); Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371-72; see supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
158. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311-12.
159. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361 ("In preparing its cadets for military leadership, VMI seeks to teach
self-control, self-discipline, and the subordination of personal desires to the greater good.").
160. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
161. Id. at 593.
162. See Minard, supra note 14, at 973 (arguing "that school prayer at public institutions of higher
learning should be unconstitutional"); Pihos, supra note 83, at 1353 (arguing "that the amount of
protection the Establishment Clause provides against prayer in a school environment greatly depends
on the level of education at which the prayer occurs").
163. See generally Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339 (stating that federal district and appellate
courts are "fashioning a 'bright-line' rule for determining where the Marsh train collides with the K- 12
train: at any level of government 'higher' than K-12, the Marsh rule prevails").
164. See id. at 339.
165. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2003). ("Put simply, the supper prayer
does not share Marsh's 'unique history.' ... We are therefore unable to apply Marsh's reasoning to the
evaluation of the constitutionality of the supper prayer.").
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question. 166 Generally, no other framework besides Marsh has appeared to analyze
public prayer involving adults. 167 Courts in other circuits have chiefly focused on
the age and maturity of those in attendance, not the historical context of legislative
prayer. 168 As in the Fourth Circuit, the case law arising in other circuits has
primarily focused on two categorical scenarios: colleges and universities and other
types of adults' interaction with government.
69
As the applicable commentary points out, there is a relatively small amount of
jurisprudence regarding prayer in higher education compared to the overwhelming
breadth of case law regarding prayer in elementary and secondary schools. 170 In
addition to Mellen, there are only two other federal appellate cases on higher
education prayer. In similar situations, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
declared that invocations and benedictions at public university events do not violate
the Establishment Clause.' 7' In Chaudhuri, a Hindu professor challenged
Tennessee State University's practice of praying at university functions on
Establishment Clause grounds.'72 The Sixth Circuit, using a Lemon analysis, held
the university's practices did not violate the Establishment Clause and also
expressly declined to use the coercion test. "' "Lee v. Weisman does not control the
case at bar .... Lee attached particular importance to the youth of the audience and
the risk of peer pressure and 'indirect coercion' in the primary and secondary
school context."' 74 Further, "[t]here was absolutely no risk that Dr. Chaudhuri--or
any other unwilling adult listener-would be indoctrinated by exposure to the
prayers."1
75
The Seventh Circuit also held that university prayers at a graduation ceremony
are constitutional. In Tanford, a law professor and several students challenged
Indiana University's practice of including an invocation and benediction in
graduation exercises. 17 6 The Seventh Circuit pointedly refused to extend Lee's
coercion test to the university realm for two reasons. First, no coercion existed
166. See Chaudhuri v. Tenn., 130 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating "Lee v. Weisman does
not control the case at bar"); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982,986 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating "[u]nder these
facts, in which the special concerns underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Lee are absent, the
district court correctly determined that Lee does not require the challenged practices to be struck
down").
167. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339.
168. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
170. Minard, supra note 14, at 972; Pihos, supra note 83, at 1353.
171. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 240; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986.
172. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 233-34.
173. Id. at 236-38. Evaluating all three Lemon prongs, the court found that Tennessee State
University's prayer practice was constitutional because it was "intended to solemnize events and
encourage reflection." Id. at 237.
174. Id. at 238.
175. Chaudhuri v. Tenn., 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 1997). As a further distinction from Lee,
the court stressed that faculty were encouraged, but not required, to attend the events in question-even
if they are present, they do not have participate. Id.
176. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 983-85 (7th Cir. 1997).
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because neither attendance nor overt participation in the prayers was required.'77
Second, university students can understand and appreciate the difference between
government speech and private speech; thus, coercion was not a proper test in this
context. 17 8 In the three university contexts in which coercion has been raised at the
appellate level, the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to apply the coercion test.
Although Tennessee State University and Indiana University have a different
educational environment than VMI,179 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits focused more
on the age and maturity aspects of coercion than on the atmosphere, thereby
adhering to a bright line distinction between prayers involving adults and those
involving minors."' Indeed, it is this difference in the perceived crux of the
coercion test that makes the Fourth Circuit's interpretation significant.1
8 1
The Sixth Circuit also had an opportunity to address an adult religious situation
not clearly within the confines of Marsh or school prayer jurisprudence. In Coles
v. Cleveland Board of Education,'82 the Sixth Circuit declined to apply the Marsh
legislative prayer analysis to prayers made at the beginning of school board
meetings; the court held that the school board, though a "deliberative public body,"
was so closely intertwined with the school that the proper line of analysis was that
of the school prayerjurisprudence.'8 3 Although Coles was ultimately decided under
Lemon, 184 the Coles court did not discount the coercion test; the court applied the
coercion test to students who often attended and participated in school board
meetings."' Interestingly, however, coercion was not an explicit consideration for
the adults in attendance. Additionally, as in Mellen, the Coles court decided to
construe Marsh narrowly and to not apply it to every adult prayer situation.'
86
Jurisprudence has been scarce on public prayer issues falling outside of the
public elementary or secondary school context and outside of the legislative prayer
context. Among the decisions that do provide insight, however, the Fourth
177. Id. at 985-86.
178. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981)).
179. See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239 (noting the voluntariness of all prayer practices for faculty);
Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-86 (noting the completely voluntary nature of Indiana University's graduation
exercises); Minard, supra note 14, at 981-83 (describing the educational environment at VMI).
180. See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339-43.
181. See Mellen II, 341 F.3d 312, 320-22 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
182. 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 380-82. The court held "the school board, unlike other public bodies, is an integral
part of the public school system." Id. at 381. The court further highlighted the common presence of
school-aged children at school board meetings: "The fact that the board regularly presents honors and
awards to students at its meetings only provides added enticements for students to attend school board
meetings. Furthermore, students who wish to challenge their suspension or expulsion from school are
required by statute to air their grievances at a school board meeting. For such students, attendance at
a board meeting is not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity." Id. at 382.
184. Id. at 384-85.
185. Id. at 383.
186. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2003); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
171 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., No. 03-2870 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3329, at *16-32 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2005) (using Coles to find school board prayer
unconstitutional).
2006]
19
Halligan: Coercing Adults: The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Reli
Published by Scholar Commons, 2006
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Circuit's analysis of the coercion test in Mellen remains the most extensive. All
other appellate courts considering these issues. 7 have analyzed the facts based on
age and maturity rather than on a dispositive coercive environment test. Had the
challenged practices in Chaudhuri, Tanford, or Coles reached the Fourth Circuit,
they may or may not have met the coercive atmosphere standards expressed in
Mellen. Nevertheless, litigants in the Fourth Circuit in a non-legislative adult
prayer setting must consider coercion. The Supreme Court has not yet viewed the
interpretive split among circuits as demanding its attention;'88 thus, jurisdictions
within the Fourth Circuit must be aware of and adapt to its precedent.
VI. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR JURISDICTIONS WITHIN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
By virtue of its decision in Mellen and subsequent opinions exploring the
nuances of the coercion test, the Fourth Circuit left substantive questions
unanswered with regard to civic life for adults that do not fall into a clear legislative
prayer scenario. What was once a bright line based on age and maturity' 9 no
longer applies in the Fourth Circuit-at least not based on current jurisprudence.
This Section explores reactions in South Carolina and other Fourth Circuit
jurisdictions and investigates some areas of potential conflict.
As a general sentiment, South Carolina citizens approve of and participate in
government-sponsored prayer in a variety of settings, including school events and
town council meetings, regardless of court precedent. '9 0 Therefore, several aspects
of the Fourth Circuit's recent decisions have both provoked change and increased
resistance. In the wake of Mellen, two distinct changes emerged in the Fourth
Circuit. The Citadel, a military college in South Carolina, rethought its position
concerning its daily student-led prayers in the mess hall."'9 Further, the U.S. Naval
187. Only two circuits have touched this issue in depth. See supra note 166 and accompanying
text. There is, however, current litigation and debate in several circuits regarding nuances of such
jurisprudence, especially the school board issues tackled in Coles. See generally Laura Green, Panel
Seeks Help on Prayer Lawsuit, Signs Seem to Indicate that the School Board May be Poised to Go to
Court, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Feb. 10, 2004, at BM I (reporting challenges to the Lord's Prayer at
a Florida school board meeting); Christine Harvey, School Boards Try to Divine Answer on Prayer;
Tangipahoa Ruling Reverberates in Area, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 20, 2005, National,
at I (noting that multiple school boards in Louisiana face challenges in the wake of Tangipahoa Parish).
188. See Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1021 (2004).
189. Buchanan, supra note 26, at 339.
190. See Richele Keel Taylor, Note, God Bless the Kickoff: School Prayer in South Carolina in
the Wake of Santa Fe v. Doe, 53 S.C. L. REV. 167, 179-80 (2001) (finding that many South Carolinians
desired to continue prayer at high school football games even in the wake of Santa Fe); see also Ron
Barnett, Upstate Groups Grapple with Court's Prayer Ruling, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Aug. 8, 2004,
at 16A (describing a great deal of negative feedback from town council members accustomed to
praying, with overt references to Jesus Christ, during meetings).
191. Dave Munday, The Citadel Rethinks Prayer: VMIRuling May Affect Traditional Mealtime
Observance, THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 30, 2003, at 1A.
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Academy's lunchtime prayer has recently come under attack from the Anti-
Defamation League. 1
92
The decisions in Wynne and Simpson have also provoked a great deal of
activity. Many town councils and other bodies in South Carolina have vocally
asserted their desire and intentions to continue invoking the name of Jesus Christ
in their public prayers.' 93 This sentiment is an apparent theme throughout the
Fourth Circuit, in cities and towns as varied as Raleigh, North Carolina to Culpeper,
Virginia.'94 As the Herald reported, town councilman and local attorney Jim Reno
of Rock Hill, South Carolina, intended to defy the Wynne ruling because "he always
prays to Jesus and when it comes his turn to lead colleagues in prayer, he will
follow his beliefs."' 95 Further, South Carolina Attorney General Henry McMaster,
who represented the town of Great Falls in its appeal to the Fourth Circuit in
Wynne, has refused to give guidance to municipal governments in the wake of this
Fourth Circuit precedent. 9 6 The only statewide instruction following Wynne stems
from the South Carolina Municipal Association, which advises members not to
invoke a specific deity in their prayers.'97 This is a difficult position to take in
South Carolina, especially because some state leaders advocate a blatant disregard
for judicial precedent. For example, State Senator Mike Fair stated in response to
Wynne, "I personally would choose to ignore it and would encourage any and all
(local governments) in South Carolina to ignore it."'' 8 This type of attitude makes
participation in civic life dependent on accepting a particular religious faith.
Resistance to amending prayers that the Fourth Circuit has clearly declared
unconstitutional is pervasive in South Carolina and presents a fertile field for
litigation.
With such passionate responses to mandatory changes in legislative prayers,
what is the fate of areas of adult prayer that are not clearly legislative? Because
Mellen expanded the Fourth Circuit's standards in this area, multiple scenarios
remain open to challenge either based on coercion grounds or based on the Mellen
court's concern about making participation in a public community dependent on
religious influences. 99 Further, given the attitudes of many council members and
192. Grant Huang & Arthur Hirsch, Challenge to Lunch Prayer at Academy, BALT. SUN, July 7,
2005, at IA. The Naval Academy is the only United States Military Service Academy to include such
prayers. Id. The format is that chaplains of different faiths give daily lunchtime prayers. Id.
193. See Barnett, supra note 190, at 16A; Councils Face Public Prayer Critics, STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Oct. 4, 2005, at B5; Terry Plumb, Cities Flout Courts' Ruling on Prayer, HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), July 3, 2005, at I E; Tim Smith, A CL U Targets Council Prayers, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Sept.
20, 2005, at 13B.
194. See Claudia Assis, Ruling Puts Prayers Under Renewed Scrutiny, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Norfolk, Va.), July 30,2004, at B 1; Marc Fisher, Old-Time Religion is Not Silenced Easily in Culpeper,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2004, at BO 1; John Zebrowski, Public Meetings, Christian Prayers, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 20, 2003, at A19.
195. Plumb, supra note 193, at 1E.
196. Councils Face, supra note 193, at B5.
197. Id.
198. Barnett, supra note 190, at 16A.
199. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003).
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state officials, prayer in any context in South Carolina will remain predominately
Christian."00 What kinds of atmospheres, then, are coercive enough to fall under the
Fourth Circuit's standard of coercion analysis? 2 1  Several examples exist:
university settings, blessings at town or county council luncheons or other meals,
and school board meetings.
Many public universities have invocations or benedictions as a part of a variety
of university events. For example, the University of South Carolina offers public
prayers as a part of student government meetings.2 2 Although Establishment
Clause cases are highly fact-sensitive and the resolution of each case depends on
unique distinctions,23 the coercion test provides a vehicle to challenge government-
sponsored prayer. A more relevant example-and closer in effect to the "coercive
atmosphere" in Mellen2° -4 would involve a public university football team. At the
University ofGeorgia and Florida State University, both in the Eleventh Circuit, the
"Christian beliefs of coaches Mark Richt and Bobby Bowden pervade the players'
environment. 20 5 Football players are university students, adults much like the
cadets at VMI, who are immersed in an intense, team-focused atmosphere. Thus,
participation and acceptance in this "community" are somewhat conditioned on
participation in and acceptance of a pervasive religious viewpoint and
environment.20 6 Were this situation to arise in a public college or university in the
Fourth Circuit, coercion would be a likely framework for analysis.
Other situations outside the university setting could also give rise to questions
about the coercion test and its applicability to challenged practices. Prayers for the
town or county council that are not legislative, such as blessings before meals, seem
to fall in this gap in precedent. Courts have construed Marsh narrowly207-the
religious purpose of blessing food is not exactly synonymous with the historical
200. According to South Carolina State Senator Mike Fair, "To pray to a generic god is to pray
to no god." Barnett, supra note 190, at 16A.
201. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
202. Justin Chapura, Williams Addresses Students; Devotion Resolution Defeated, GAMECOCK
(University of South Carolina), Sept. 22, 2005, at IA. The student government opens its meetings with
a devotional or prayer often invoking Christ. See, e.g., Minutes of the University of South Carolina
Student Senate 1-2 (Mar. 16,2005), http://www.sg.sc.edu/senatejournal/Marchl6.pdf. A part of the
meeting's agenda often includes Bible readings, testimonial, or prayer. Id. This practice has recently
been challenged unsuccessfully. Chapura, supra note 202, at 1A.
203. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (expressing the desire not "to be confined
to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
204. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
205. Michelle Hiskey, Bulldogs, Seminoles Send Up Prayers When Off Field, Too, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Dec. 31, 2002, at 1 A. For example, at the University of Georgia, Bibles bearing a cover stating
"God's Game Plan" are prevalent in the locker room, as is a poster quoting John 3:16. Id. Also, "almost
every team member attends the pregame chapel. Only tailback Musa Smith, a Muslim, sometimes
skips." Id. See also Joe Drape, Increasingly, Football's Playbooks Callfor Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2005, at I (profiling the football programs at the University of Georgia and Florida State University
and confirming that their pervasive religious atmospheres persist).
206. But see Drape, supra note 205, at 1 (former Georgia tailback Musa Smith, a Muslim, "did
not attend chapel services with his teammates. When he did pray with them, he stuck to his own
prayers. Mr. Smith said he was inspired by the example set by Mr. Richt.").
207. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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justification the Court used when referring to opening a session of a legislative
body. °8
Another major category that straddles the line between legislative and non-
legislative prayer is prayer before a school board meeting. Although the Sixth
Circuit in Coles recognized that the question of which body of jurisprudence to
apply to this scenario was caught "between the proverbial rock and a hard place, 20 9
regardless of how the Fourth Circuit resolves this question, a coercion based
analysis is available. If, like the Coles court, the Fourth Circuit decides that school
board prayer is analogous to school prayer jurisprudence generally, Lee, Santa Fe,
and Child Evangelism make the coercion test a possible means of analysis. If,
however, school board prayer is deemed not legislative but within the adult prayer
jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit may apply its Mellen rationale regarding coercion.
While all of these prayers may run afoul with the Establishment Clause through the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, or a combination of relevant tests, having an
environmentally based coercion test as a viable option remains unique to the Fourth
Circuit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit has gone beyond the established confines of the coercion
test as decided by the Supreme Court, but it has also used the Supreme Court's own
coercion test to analyze the boundaries and nuances of its definition and
application. By including adult prayer situations under the coercion test analysis
and defining coercion as an atmosphere not necessarily dependent on the age or
maturity of the people involved, the Fourth Circuit has stretched Supreme Court
jurisprudence that focused on age and maturity. 10 The Supreme Court assumes that
adults have a sufficient ability to differentiate between government speech and
individual speech and that they will not to be unconstitutionally coerced to
participate in a prayer with which they do not agree.
At the same time, however, Supreme Court precedent explores the
permutations and nuances of coercion and reflects many of the environmental
concerns expressed in Mellen.21  The Fourth Circuit overstepped Supreme Court
limits on age in its Mellen holding and found a religiously coercive environment at
a public military college, even though the adult cadets chose to attend, were not
forced to participate, and were "deemed ready to vote, to fight for our country, and
208. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (commenting that "[fqrom colonial times
through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with
the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom").
209. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1999).
210. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see also Pihos,
supra note 83, at 1353 (noting that concerns over age and maturity have led courts to read the
Establishment Clause somewhat differently for different age groups).
211. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-312 (2000); Lee, 505 U.S. at 592;
supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
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to die for our freedoms. ' '212 However, the Mellen court also recognized the more
subtle aspects of coercion and firmly placed the core of its an analysis in the
ramifications for community identity and participation.213 In subsequent decisions,
the Fourth Circuit has limited Mellen, twice refusing to apply the coercion test to
Establishment Clause challenges firmly rooted in legislative prayer.214  Fourth
Circuit jurisprudence, therefore, identified a substantive hole in the Supreme
Court's coercion test, yet important questions remain as to the extent that this
nuanced approach applies to the wide realm of other public prayer situations.
South Carolina, as well as other states in the Fourth Circuit, is generally hostile
to prohibitions, or even limitations, on public prayer.215 If municipal governments
want to stay within the bounds of the law as defined by the Fourth Circuit, offering
non-sectarian prayers is likely the most viable compromise. Further, other public
bodies offering prayers for adults must be aware that the Fourth Circuit's expanded
coercion test may apply in other situations, such as university events, blessings
before a meal, and school board meetings. Again, non-sectarian prayer could be a
safe avenue but does not completely foreclose an Establishment Clause
challenge. 16 Coercion, as its name suggests, involves peer pressure and compels
one to do or submit to a practice he or she would otherwise not do.2"7 Inserting this
standard into the context of adult public prayer invites challenges in realms not yet
considered by the Supreme Court.
Elizabeth B. Halligan
212. Mellen, 341 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
213. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003).
214. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
216. As the case law points out, even Fourth Circuit cases that involve coercion are also analyzed
under other Establishment Clause tests. See Child Evangelism v. Fellowship of Md., Inc. v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 601 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying the coercion test as well
as other tests); Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372-76 (applying the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the
coercion test).
217. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating "the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise"); see also
Cohen, supra note 62, at 512-13 (examining the language and impact of Lee's coercion standards).
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